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Quasi-governmental Business Improvement Districts ("BIDs")
have proliferated in cities across the country. By compensating for
the service deficiencies of under-performing city governments, BIDs
have been a notable bright-spot in what has otherwise been a grim
half-century for America's cities. BIDs have been hailed as a
remarkable practical success in the struggle to revitalize urban centers
and neighborhoods throughout America. However, their
constitutional roots have yet to be explored in significant depth by
law and politics scholars.
The decades-long decline in the health and wealth of urban
politics and affairs has been well documented. The flight of middle-
class residents, retail and business to the suburbs and exurbs has left
cities with depleted resources, crumbling infrastructure, a deflated tax
base, and an increasingly needy population. At the same time,
suburban municipalities, armed with the power to draw political
boundaries and keep urban poverty at bay through exclusionary
zoning, immunized themselves from many of the worst problems
* Ph.D., Johns Hopkins University, 2009: J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1999. This
article benefited from the comments of participants and attendees of a panel at the 2010
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in Chicago where a version of this paper
was first presented. Particular thanks to discussant Michael Coenen, for his thoughtful
and encouraging commentary.
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faced by cities. Suburban shopping malls privatized the retail
environment, likewise avoiding the chaos, crime and disorder
increasingly associated with traditional urban retail districts. In light
of the dramatic competitive advantages afforded by the political
structure and privatized nature of suburban America, the plight of
America's cities seemed irreversible. BIDs, however, fuse the power
of mandatory taxation with private sector business savvy, to
successfully co-opt the privatized suburban model.
With the use of BIDs, downtown business districts can now
circumvent reliance upon cash strapped city governments, and instead
opt for professional management akin to that found in a suburban
shopping mall. However, while BIDs mark a notable victory for the
urban condition, they have also garnered significant criticism. BIDs
continue to face constitutional challenges in courts across the country
due to their innovative, yet constitutionally questionable, quasi-
governmental structure.' BIDs are endowed with many of the powers
traditionally possessed by urban governments, yet are arguably
undemocratic, and ultimately structured to serve the interests of
business, not of the people.
I argue that although BIDs have been a net positive for cities,
they were a creature of necessity. BIDs present a range of
constitutionally problematic issues that have yet to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. At the same time, the very need for BIDs is
arguably attributable to a larger political structure that has resulted
from a series of flawed and contentious Supreme Court decisions
preferring localism over equality and privatization over free speech. I
assess the constitutional and political implications of BIDs in light of
Supreme Court jurisprudence that placed a constitutional stamp of
approval on municipal fragmentation, inequality and privatization-
conditions that made BIDs an essential tool for urban success.
I. The Setting
Picture a large American city with more than one million
residents. As with many older cities, the past half-century has been
less than kind. This city spent many decades immersed in hard times,
losing much of its middle and upper income population to
neighboring suburban communities. As a result of its dwindling tax
1. See, e.g., Khanukayev v. Time Square Alliance, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51607
(S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010); white Plains Business Improvement Dist. v. Spano, 2007 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb 23, 2007); Zimmerman v. City of Memphis, 67 S.W.3d 798
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
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base, the city was forced to drastically cut back on the services it
provides. Trash pickup was reduced to once a week, street cleaning
was phased out, and regular maintenance of street lights, sidewalks,
and streets was cut back drastically. The crumbling infrastructure and
dirty streets only accelerated the city's decline, leading to business
closures and further residential losses.
The remaining businesses in the central downtown district-now
representing just a small fraction of the business community that once
flourished in more prosperous times-are desperate to reverse this
dire situation. However, in a large city with a rapidly shrinking tax
base and many other pressing priorities, these businesses have little
hope that their urban government will be inclined or capable of
responding to their concerns effectively. Attempts to voluntarily
collaborate and pool funds to fill the gaps in municipal service that
are growing wider by the day repeatedly fail, because the temptation
of a free ride is simply too great, particularly in a community of
businesses struggling for their very survival.
This is when the idea of a BID takes hold. A BID allows for
compulsory taxation without dependence upon revenue-starved,
social service-providing urban governance.2 BIDs capitalize on many
of the benefits of government, while avoiding the weight and
inefficiency that accompanies conflicting political and social
interests-a burden inherent in a truly democratic municipal
structure.
As a result of the new BID, things eventually start to look up for
the city's downtown. As the central business district begins to get
cleaned up, pedestrians once again feel comfortable navigating the
district on foot. As foot traffic increases, businesses begin to thrive
once more. Real estate price shoot up. The mayor, city council and
other stakeholders are relieved. In fact, with the BID providing
supplemental services to the most visible, and arguably important,
section of town, city officials feel empowered to cut services further
across the city, helping to mitigate some of its fiscal difficulties. The
BID has done everything possible to return the business district to
prosperity, supplementing the many areas where urban governance
has failed to come through. In this small district with a residential
population making up just a small fraction of the entire city, the
sidewalks are clean and unbroken, crime is down, and even the public
schools have been improved.
2. See infra Part IV.
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Yet, this inspiring tale of urban success comes with footnotes
attached. BIDs achieve their goals by harnessing the power of
coercive taxation while at the same time eliminating the "messiness"
of democracy. And there is much reason to believe that BIDs run
counter to Constitutional principle. BIDs operate in what are
perhaps America's most quintessentially public of places.' They have
succeeded by making the public square desirable once again. No
longer are places like New York's Times Square synonymous with
violence and debauchery. Cities can now respectably compete with
the privatized suburban shopping mall, the office park and the gated
community. But at what price? By making the "public"
incrementally more "private." The BID is a completely rational
choice, perhaps an essential one, in a world where the public realm
has largely been displaced by a shiny, and highly controlled, private
model.
A shopping mall might superficially have the feel of an old
fashioned town square-people busily moving from store to store,
families in tow-but those who do not conform to the narrow goals of
commerce, for example, visitors who seek to share a controversial
political message, are unwelcome. Privatization has succeeded in
bottling what worked in traditional public places-the confluence of
people and commercial activity-and ridding itself of the distractions,
the untidiness, of public life. The Constitution and all of its attendant
"inconveniences-democratic governance, equal protection, free
speech-apply with full force in the public realm, and the privatized
model found competitive advantage in eliminating these intrusive
distractions. For many decades, cities were without recourse.
However, BIDs allow cities-or at least their commercial
stakeholders-to take back some power.
With increasing competition between cities and suburbs to
attract and retain a mobile, economically attractive class of citizens,
cities eagerly embraced the BID model. Modern America is defined
by abundant choice. As growing numbers of mobile citizens make
decisions as to where to make their home, where to spend their
leisure time, and where to seek employment, a vibrant urban
environment is once again becoming a popular choice, particularly for
the young and well-educated. Many credit BIDs for making this
3. According to recent estimates there are at least 1,500 BIDs in North America, with more
than 55 BIDs in New York City alone. See Robert H. Nelson, Kyle R. McKenzie, Eileen
Norcross, Lessons from Business Improvement Districts: Building on Past Successes,
MERACATUS POLICY SERIES PRIMER No. 5, June 2008 at 2-3.
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possible.! By supplementing municipal services in urban business
districts, BIDs have helped many cities bounce back from years of
decline.
II. What is a BID?
Although BIDs have roots in legal structures dating back more
than a century, their current form has only taken shape in the past
twenty to thirty years.! They are an unusual hybrid between public
and private institutions and are funded through assessments of
additional taxes on property owners within designated boundaries.
The business and property owning community who foot the bill for
BID activities typically provides the impetus for a BID.! Although
BIDs vary dramatically in both their size and ambitions, and can be
found engaging in a wide range of activities, they most frequently
"focus on traditional municipal activities, such as garbage collection,
street maintenance, and security patrols."" Larger BIDs, like
Philadelphia's Center City District, also play a management role,
promoting the city through marketing, engaging in strategic planning
for the district, sponsoring events, initiating capital projects and
providing grants or loans for storefront fagade improvement.!
The BID has roots in two traditional tools of urban governance:
Special Assessment and Special Purpose Districts.o Like Special
Assessment Districts, BIDs impose coercive supplemental taxes on a
limited set of landowners for a narrow benefit that is both public and
private in nature. BIDs differ in that the additional taxes are
generally not a "one-shot device." BIDs tend to promote more
diffuse benefits (albeit within the confines of the designated district),
and Special Assessment Districts generally mark a unit of territory,
not of governance." Special Purpose Districts, while taking a wide
range of forms, are similar to BIDs in that they represent a
4. See, e.g., Paul Levy, Paying for the Public Life, 15 EcoN. DEV. QUARTERLY 124
(2001).
5. Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement District and
Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 365, 367 (1999).
6. Id. at 368.
7. Id. at 369.
8. Id. at 368-69.
9. See CENTER CITY PHILADELPHIA, http://www.centercityphila.org/about/CCD.php (last
visited Sep. 27, 2010).
10. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 414.
11. Id. at 416.
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specialized governmental subunit, serve a limited purpose, are
governed by their own boards, and are in most respects legally
independent of other governmental units.12 However, unlike BIDs,
Special Purpose Districts tend to focus on just one discrete goal,
typically on physical infrastructure, and are frequently funded by user
charges rather than assessments. Thus, BIDs are similar to their
urban development predecessors, yet differ in substantial ways.
IH. The BID Debate
BIDs represent a radical shift in urban development strategy.
While businesses have traditionally sought to reduce the financial
burden of taxation, BIDs have been voluntarily and enthusiastically
embraced by urban businesses across the county. Why? Improving
the public environment in many downtown retail, business and
entertainment districts through additional assessments offers a means
of attracting and retaining business. Paul Levy, the executive director
of Philadelphia's Center City District and one of the most visible
boosters of the BID concept, argues that BIDs are spurred by a
combination of fear and opportunity.14 Fear is caused by the exodus
of a large employer, the closing of a historic retail establishment, a
rash of new crime, a sudden increase in graffiti, or by other ailments
of modern urban decline." Opportunity can take the form of a new
convention center, concert hall, sports facility or a high profile event
coming to town. 6 The culmination of the two brings quality of life
issues into focus, and can act as a trigger for the development of a
BID.
"Suburban malls, office parks, and entertainment complexes are
managed places with single owners .. . [run by] savvy professionals,
up to date on trends and on the innovations of their competitors.""
To their proponents, BIDs offer cities a fighting chance to compete
with these highly managed establishments. In the modern context,
choice of location-whether as a shopper, employee, resident or
entertainment-seeker-is in many respects akin to any other
consumer choice. This competitive climate was observed by political
12. Id. at 418.
13. Id. at 419.
14. Levy, supra note 4, at 124.




scientist Paul Peterson thirty years ago, well before the mass
proliferation of the BID. He argued that "cities, like private firms,
compete with one another so as to maximize their economic
position.... [T]he city must entice labor and capital resources by
offering appropriate inducements."' 8  And now, to an even greater
extent than when Peterson wrote, cities must compete not only with
other cities but with suburbs and exurbs, both nationally and
internationally. Office campuses, shopping malls, suburban
subdivisions, and theme parks offer a wide range of innovative
amenities. A traditional city, it is argued, will not be able to compete
without providing a baseline standard of cleanliness and safety-the
fundamental goal of most BIDs. "When cities were manufacturing
and distribution centers, neither the quality of the public environment
nor a focus on customer service mattered much... . But in the highly
competitive and post-industrial economy, quality-of-life issues
become paramount.""
Proponents of the BID model argue that BIDs should be seen as
a supplement to, rather than a replacement of, public governance and
urban street life.20 While BIDs might be motivated by business
interests, the benefits of their activities are arguably broad and
diffuse. No one is charged admission to a public park abutting the
retail district, recently renovated and cleaned by BID employees.
Nor is a fee charged to take a leisurely stroll through one of the
recently rehabilitated, and now very expensive, historic
neighborhoods that are being revived as a result of the improvment of
American downtowns. Thus, BID proponents argue that it is a
service to the entire city and region to make the center of town a
showpiece that engenders pride in all citizens, regardless of
socioeconomic class.2' In contrast to gated communities and other
formerly public, privatized places, one might argue that BIDs seek to
attract all sorts of people to downtowns, and seek to repopulate long-
neglected public spaces.
18. PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 29 (1981).
19. Levy, supra note 4, at 125-26 (emphasis added).
20. Lorlene Hoyt and Devika Gopal-Agge, The Business Improvement District Model: A
Balanced Review of Contemporary Debates, 1 GEOGRAPHY COMPASS 946, 953 (2007).
21. Levy, supra note 4, at 124 (observing that "regional shopping centers had no qualms
about lifting Jane Jacob's insights about active streetlife, placing them under glass, and turning
on the air conditioning. What's wrong when downtowns, blessed with historic architecture and
real civic spaces, steal back from the mall the innovation of the CAM [Common Area
Maintenance] charge?").
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Much of the success of BIDs has been credited to their hybrid,
quasi-governmental structure. BIDs have stepped in, with the added
benefit of private-sector business acumen, to fill in the gaps left
behind by struggling municipalities-without any additional cost to
the cash strapped cities. Cities have lost significant support from the
federal government in recent decades and "BIDs took the 'new
federalism' seriously: If you want it, you're going to have to fund it
yourself."22 In older cities these supplementary services are especially
critical. Faced with high levels of poverty and a declining tax base,
such cities often cannot afford to focus on small-scale aesthetic
concerns. But it is often these issues, creating a city streetscape that is
perceived to be clean and safe, that can determine the future success
or failure of a city. The importance of focusing on "public
perception" has long been well understood by those in the business
community. And BID proponents would likely argue that the private
sector is much better equipped to address this issue than city hall.
Indeed, recent scholarship has suggested that many BID services,
including the improvement of the appearance of public spaces, are
responsible for deterring criminal activity on the streets.23 In
accordance with the "Broken Windows" theory of crime prevention,
pedestrians will be more likely to frequent public spaces free of
graffiti and litter, and in turn, criminals will be less likely to strike in
these orderly areas with high pedestrian traffic.24 Further, "routine
activities theory" suggests a link between the presence of "informal,
yet capable guardians," in this case uniformed BID-employed street
sweepers, and reduced criminal activity.25
However, there is a dark side to this equation. One common
critique of this argument-the most visible (and literal) example
being New York City's Times Square BID-is that such a perspective
will lead to the "Disneyfication" of public spaces.26 Such critics argue
that cities should remain distinct from shopping malls and theme
parks, and that by following this "managed" model we risk stripping
22. Id. at 126 (original emphasis).
23. Lorlene M. Hoyt, Do Business Improvement District Organizations Make a Difference?
Crime In and Around Commercial Areas in Philadelphia, 25 J. PLANNING EDUC. AND RESEARCH
25 185 (2005).
24. Id. at 188-189. While the Broken Windows theory has been criticized as empirically
unsubstantiated, many adherents attest to its validity. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
25. Hoyt, supra note 23, at 189.
26. Hoyt and Gopal-Agge, supra note 20, at 955.
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cities of the very character that make cities unique and desirable
environments.27 Even though BIDs are typically granted limited and
seemingly benign powers, some question whether they actually
represent a nefarious trend.' Some critics worry that BIDs threaten
to "over-regulate public space," particularly where BID personnel
provide supplemental security and maintenance services.29 Public
streets, unlike private shopping malls, do not exist purely to serve the
financial interests of the businesses that populate them.
Superimposing private management models on public places might
diminish the relative voice and interests of the nonconsuming public.
With the proliferation of BIDs, which place primacy on profit, will
the public street remain, unlike the suburban shopping mall,
fundamentally public? Do BIDs they foster an elitist urban
environment designed to keep out "undesirables?"
Certainly, a more prosperous downtown with thriving upscale
retail, costly tourist attractions, white-collar office jobs and pricey
restraints will not explicitly cater to all socioeconomic classes.
Anyone who has frequented Manhattan or other gentrified city
centers in recent years can attest to the homogenizing effects of such
change. Some critics have suggested that BIDs have the potential to
divert funding and services away less affluent urban areas thereby
exacerbating wealth-based inequalities between neighborhoods.'
BIDs are explicitly designed to serve the interests of the businesses
that fund them. While these interests may align with the interests of
citizens and visitors to the city, there is no reason to believe that this
will always be the case. Although BIDs may provide certain broad-
based quality of life benefits, BIDs are essentially privately interested
organizations stepping into roles that were formerly assumed to be
the province of democratically elected governments. Indeed, many
critics characterize BIDs as one more example of private sector
incursion on government responsibilities," to the detriment of those
outside of the private sector. "[S]ome allege that BIDs function more
like 'clubs' of property and business owners that have been given the
power to manage public spaces."32
27. Id.
28. Id. at 954.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 953.
31. Id at 951.
32. Id.
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Other critics question whether BIDs services exacerbate
inequality by violating the norm of equitable public services
distribution." By providing additional services in accordance with a
district's willingness to pay, BIDs by definition, create intracity
inequality. The existence of a BID might also draw greater attention
to the district area, and in turn encourage the receipt of additional
municipal services that it would not otherwise have received. BIDs
are likely to bring attention to district needs "like potholes and
broken street lights, and are effective at reporting these problems to
responsible city agencies and pressing for the necessary repairs."4 As
the "eyes and ears" of the district, a BID may be more proactive in
requesting city police resources, drawing officers away from other
neighborhoods. However, such inequality may be produced in the
opposite direction as well. Some BID members may contend that the
provision of extra services by the BID ultimately leads the city to cut
back on services provided to the portion of the city covered by the
BID. While this might be perceived to be unfair to those property
owners paying additional taxes in the BID, such reapportionment
might free up city resources to increase services in less affluent
neighborhoods.
The creation of a BID does invariably involve a tradeoff between
increased inequality and the benefits the BID brings to downtown
districts and the city at large. BID proponents, however, appear
comfortable affording a privileged status to the downtown
commercial district, emphasizing a business district's critical role as
the locus of metropolitan areas." In the case of BIDs that serve the
commercial heart of a city, BID benefits might arguably "trickle-
down" to other parts of the city and region: By making the downtown
business district more attractive and competitive, BIDs encourage job
growth; by making the city a more attractive residential destination,
BIDs might lead to increased property values throughout the city;
and by improving the image of the symbolic heart of the region, the
morale of all residents might receive a boost.
In the example of Philadelphia, "the downtown is just 3% of the
city's total land area, but holds 85% of the city's commercial office
space, 67% of hotel rooms, provides 40% of the city's jobs ... [b]ut
33. Id. at 953.
34. Briffault, supra note 5, at 463.
35. Levy, supra note 4, at 126.
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this economic engine is home to just 2% of the electorate."3 6 With
such a disproportionately small percentage of the electorate relative
to its economic significance, there is support for the assertion that
downtown districts are in fact in need of extra-municipal services.
Thus, arguments regarding inequality of public services might be
more compelling when applied to BIDs located in select,
economically advantaged, peripheral urban neighborhoods. The
provision of services in downtown business districts arguably raises a
different set of concerns because of the profound impact downtowns
have on the city and region at large.
Furthermore, BID proponents would urge that assertions of
inequality be tempered by perspective.3 The budgets of BIDs are
remarkably small when compared to that of municipalities." For
example, in New York City, home of the most extensive network of
BIDs in the country, total BID assessments come to "less than two-
tenths of one percent of the city's $34 billion budget."3 A portion of
these BIDs' budgets "is devoted to marketing, promotions and other
direct business-related services that would be irrelevant to residential
areas."40 Indeed, when compared to the vast levels of inequality that
exist between various suburban and urban municipalities within a
metropolitan region, it might be argued that the inequality created
within a city by the existence of a BID is relatively insignificant.
IV. BIDs as Governance
Does a BID represent the privatization of government? Much
concern has been raised as to whether it is proper for a private
organization to act in a public governmental capacity.' A BID's
unelected board is handed significant authority, power that was
traditionally in the hands of a democratically elected municipal
government. In this respect, BIDs are seen as undemocratic. It is
argued that the growth of "BIDs threatens the principle of 'public
stewardship' of public spaces, and necessarily 'represents a narrowing
of the public sphere."' 42 As a replacement of local government, BIDs
36. Id.
37. Hoyt and Gopal-Agge, supra note 20, at 953-54.
38. Briffault, supra note 5, at 464.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Nelson, McKenzie, and Norcross, supra note 3, at 12-13.
42. Briffault, supra note 5, at 373.
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are said to jeopardize the long-standing principle of "equal provision
of public services."43 And finally, many claim that BIDs are
insufficiently accountable to the residents of the BID district and the
residents of the city at large."
BID formation and structure can vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. However, all BIDs must be established in accordance
with the specific BID enabling legislation in the state where they are
formed. 45 Enactment of a local law or ordinance addressing the basic
functions and limits of the BID is usually required; discretion over
whether or not to create a BID, regardless of the degree of private
sector support, ultimately lies with the city." In many states, to
varying degrees, landowners also have the right to veto a
municipality's approval of a BID.47 Once formed, BIDs can take on a
variety of structural forms, depending on the locality. However, the
majority are governed by a board of directors made up of property
owners and prominent civic leaders. This "board is officially the
principal decisionmaker in a BID's management structure, just as a
corporate board of directors is in a more conventional nonprofit
company.""
To what extent are BIDs held accountable for their actions and
to whom should they be? Although it is generally the large property
owners, and not individual residents, who fund BIDs, BID actions
clearly have a direct impact on the citizens residing in the district.
Depriving these residents of a voice in this quasi-governmental
institution clearly raises concerns. BID proponents emphasize the
arguably limited and circumscribed nature of BID power. For
example, Brian Hochleutner argues that "less BID power means BID
officials make fewer choices about fewer things; this means that BID
officials need not be as accountable as more traditional public
officials." 49  In theory, because BIDs are established under the
authority of the elected municipal government, they are ultimately
democratically accountable for any undesirable behavior. However,
the claim that BIDs will truly be responsive to the concerns of the
43. Id.
44. Brian R. Hochleutner, BIDs Fare Well: The Democratic Accountability of Business
Improvement Districts, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374, 377 (2003).
45. Id. at 378.
46. Briffault, supra note 5, at 379.
47. Id. at 380.
48. Hochleutner, supra note 44, at 381.
49. Id. at 383.
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larger, non-property-owning public, is dubious. Many point out that,
once established, BIDs largely act with impunity.o It is likely that the
vast majority of voting city residents are not even aware of what a
"BID" is, let alone comprehend the technical attributes of BIDs'
public-private hybrid legal status. The likelihood that voters will hold
their elected officials accountable for the actions of a seemingly
private, independent organization would thus appear to be slim at
best.
A partial solution to BIDs' lack of direct accountability-sunset
provisions-has been recommended by legal scholar Richard
Briffault and other BID experts." After a designated number of
years-five is common-BIDs would be forced out of business unless
reestablished by the city in a manner similar to the procedure for
initiating the BID.52 Such requirement ostensibly ensures that the
city-and thus the citizens of both the district and municipality at
large-has the opportunity to routinely reassess the performance of
the BID. Ultimately however, BIDs maintain substantial autonomy.
Sunset provisions may thus be dismissed as simply an inadequate
patch on what is essentially a privatized, undemocratic-and perhaps
unconstitutional-institution.
A. The Constitutional Issue
Is the existence of a BID board, controlled by unelected property
owners, antidemocratic? One of the most prominent challenges to
BID governance concerns the question of whether or not the BID
structure violates the one person, one vote doctrine under the
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause." The principle of one
person, one vote, firmly established by the Supreme Court in
Reynolds v. Sims, confirms that voting is a fundamental interest "in a
free and democratic society."54 According to the Reynolds Court,
suffrage is "preservative of other basic civil and political rights" and
therefore subject to strict constitutional scrutiny." Thus, voting
schemes that provide voters in certain areas with "two times, or five
times, or ten times the weight" as "those residing in the disfavored
50. Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998).
51. Hoyt and Gopal-Agge, supra note 20, at 952.
52. Briffault, supra note 5, at 458.
53. Id. at 430.
54. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
55. Id.
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areas," have the unconstitutional effect of diluting the vote of some
voters, to the benefit of others.56 In Kramer v. Union Free School
District the Court extended this principle from inter-geographic
voting inequalities-providing greater or lesser weight to individual
voters based on the district in which they reside-to intra-geographic
inequalities-those schemes that provide the vote selectively to
particular classes of individuals within particular boundaries." Thus,
a law providing voting rights on a selective basis-here, only to those
within a school district who were deemed to have a sufficient stake in
the public schools-was deemed unconstitutional." While the Court
declined to establish an absolute constitutional prohibition on all laws
limiting "the exercise of the franchise to those 'primarily interested'
or 'primarily affected,"' the Kramer Court set a high bar for attaining
"sufficient precision" to constitutionally justify such voting regimes.59
What would be the implications for BIDs if such principles were
held to apply to the highly selective voting schemes inherent in the
structure of Business Improvement Districts across the country? If
one person, one vote did apply, states would be required to either
fully enfranchise BID district residents through elections or shift
control of the BID to city government." However, while the Supreme
Court has unequivocally concluded that the one person, one vote
principle does apply on the local level, the Court carved out a limited
exception for certain special purpose units of government.6' Thus far,
this exception has been read by lower courts to apply to BIDs.62
B. Kessler v. Grand Central District Management
The application of the one person, one vote special-purpose
exception to BID voting was tested by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1998.63 The Federal Appeals Court confronted a challenge
to one of the largest and most prominent BIDs in the nation, the
Grand Central Business Improvement District in New York City.6
Ultimately ruling in its favor, the Court concluded that the BID did
56. Id.
57. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 631-32.
60. Briffault, supra note 5, at 430.
61. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 98-99.
62. Id. at 103.
63. Id. at 92.
64. Id at 95.
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not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause." Due to the district's
"circumscribed" responsibilities and powers, its "limited goal of
improving the area for business," the significant city "control over"
the BID, and the fact that BID had a "substantially greater effect"
and concomitant "principal burden" on voting property owners, the
Court determined that the BID fell within the special district
exception to one person, one vote.6 However, it is far from clear that
other BIDs would, if challenged, similarly pass constitutional muster,
nor is it clear that the Supreme Court would arrive at the same
conclusion reached by the Second Circuit. Considering the critical
constitutional principles at stake, the High Court's precedents in
related cases, and a compelling dissent by Judge Weinstein, the
Kessler decision was, at best, a close call.
On the spectrum of urban significance, the Grand Central
Business Improvement District ("GCBID") could hardly have been
more consequential. The BID incorporated an area of midtown
Manhattan that included "approximately 71 million square feet of
commercial space." 7 While the district comprised less than twenty
percent of the commercial space on the island of Manhattan, the
office space included in the BID exceeded the entire inventory of
central business districts in cities such as "Houston, San Franscisco,
Dallas, Denver, [and] Boston."" The GCBID's functions also
extended beyond typical BID services such as sanitation and aesthetic
maintenance. The activities included employing a 63-member
security force, "operating tourist information booths," sponsoring
special events, and running a "24 hour 'outreach, assessment and
referral' facility for homeless persons that provides service such as job
training."'
Although the functions actually performed by the Grand Central
BID were perhaps more extensive than the typical BID, these
functions may represent just the tip of the iceberg. As quasi-
governmental bodies, BIDs continue to expand to fill ballooning
service gaps left in the wake of shrinking local governments budgets.
The contract between New York City and the GCBID provided a
vast grant of authority to perform "any other activities or service and
65. Id. at 93-94.
66. Id. at 104-07.
67. Id. at 95.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 95-96.
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purchases ... which the [manager of the GCBID] determines will
enhance the safety, convenience, cleanliness, attractiveness or
usefulness of the District."70 Included in the New York Municipal
Code list of approved BID activities are a startling array of
government-like functions, including, among others: "closing,
opening, widening or narrowing of existing streets; relocation of
utilities .. .; and construction of ... park areas; ... safety fixtures,
equipment and facilities; ... pedestrian overpasses and underpasses
and connections between buildings; ... ramps, sidewalks, plazas, and
pedestrian malls; ... parking lot and parking garage facilities."71
Without question, these functions are tasks historically fulfilled
by local government. Indeed, the Kessler Court readily conceded this
point.72 However, very much unlike government, a BID's board of
directors is elected in accordance with a weighted voting system that
radically diminishes the relative voice of many stakeholders in the
BID area. In the case of elections for the GCBID's management
association, the bylaws provide for four distinct voting classes.
Owners of real property in the district are deemed "Class A" voters,
and are entitled to elect thirty-one board members. 74 This privileged
class is in fact guaranteed majority representation at all times.75 On
the other hand, "Class B" voters consist of commercial tenants and
elect just 16 board members, while "Class C" voters, limited to
residential tenants, may choose just one board member.7 ' The four
"Class D" directors, in contrast, are not elected at all; they are there
by virtue of their appointment by the city.77 This weighted voting
scheme was predictably at the heart of the one person, one vote
constitutional challenge to the GCBID. "[Blecause residents are
consigned to a permanent minority status on the Board even though
they are numerically superior to the class of owners of property
70. Contract between City of New York, Department of Business Services and Grand
Central District Management Association, Inc. 5-5 (July 30, 1993); see also Kessler, 158 F.3d at
112.
71. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 980-c (McKinney 1998); see also Kessler, 158 F.3d at 112-13.
72. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 104.






within the district, they are deprived of any meaningful opportunity
to advance their interests."7 1
The common refrain? "So what?" BIDs are a win-win-win for
all involved. Cities are served by keeping businesses in the city;
businesses are served by targeting quality of life issues that would
otherwise hamper the city's survival-while at the same time avoiding
the free rider problems endemic to volunteer efforts; and other
stakeholders who reside in the BID simply reap the benefits of a
happier, healthier, cleaner, professionally managed neighborhood.
What's not to like? It is not as if BIDs are engaging in high level
policy making-they are keeping the streets clean. What could be
constitutionally suspect about this? Well, it turns out, a good deal.
This rosy portrait glosses over many troubling constitutional
implications.
As discussed previously, BIDs are not necessarily limited to
eminently uncontroversial functions such as sweeping the streets and
covering graffiti; their activities are increasingly much more extensive
than this-reaching into the realms of social welfare, policing and
urban planning, among others. For the sake of illustration, consider
the GCBID's funding and support of a homeless outreach facility.
The Kessler majority dismisses these activities by contrasting the
BID's relatively minor role with New York City as a whole, which
"has an entire Department devoted to assisting the homeless."" Even
if the BID expanded its activities, and "provided the homeless with
more extensive services, such as temporary housing," the GCBID, we
are told, would not be transformed "into a general governmental
body." 0
It is certainly true, as the Kessler majority points out, that many
non-governmental religious and charitable organizations engage in
similar activity, and concomitantly manage to avoid classification as a
"general governmental body."" However, such organizations also do
not, like BIDs, owe their survival to the benefits derived from
governmentally sanctioned mandatory taxation. Reliable funding
promotes year-to-year consistency, fostering potential dependency by
those to whom the provision of social services is provided. Like
government service entitlements, there is reason to believe that the
78. Id. at 98.
79. Id. at 105.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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homeless will come to rely on BID service programs. However, in
stark contrast with government, the homeless and their advocates
have no voice in determining the nature of these services. And there
is simply no reason to believe that the property owners and
businesses that make up the "Class A" and "Class B" voters will have
interests directly aligned with the homeless they serve. Indeed, there
is reason to believe that their interests are quite distinct-and that the
choices a BID makes as to how and what services it will provide will
be informed not by what is in the best interest of the homeless, but
rather by what will best serve "Class A" and "Class B."
Indeed, the Kessler dissent points to a 1995 City Council report
that is highly critical of the GCBID's "lack of accountability" with
regard to its social service programs." The report cites allegations
that BID "workers operated as 'goon squads"' as well as the fact that
the BID's social service arm was "subject to two separate $5 million
lawsuits stemming from incidents in 1990 and 1992 which alleged
that. .. excessive physical force [was used] against homeless
people."" As the dissent argues, "such potential episodes
demonstrate how the safety and well-being of the inhabitants of this
portion of Manhattan can be powerfully touched" by the presence of
the BID." One vision of promoting a district's "quality of life" may
directly conflict with another such vision. Political controversies over
how police are to manage homelessness are thus understandably
common." Of course, unlike a BID security force or BID social
service workers, the police are directly under the city's, and thereby
the voters', control. How a BID "hires, trains, assigns, supervises,
and disciplines its security detail can have a dramatic effect on the
lives of all those who reside where the guards patrol. District
residents' views on such subjects may differ from those of property or
business owners."8
In arriving at its conclusion that the GCBID does not contravene
the Equal Protection Clause, the Kessler Court emphasizes its
determination that the BID's "responsibilities and powers are. ..
circumscribed"-even though "a few of [its] functions are of the type
82. Id at 122.
83. Id.
84. Id at 122-23.
85. See, e.g., Damien Cave, At Key West Beach, Wondering Who's a Vagrant, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 30, 2010.
86. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 122.
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that the City also performs." However, even if one were to accept
the premise that BIDs have a relatively narrow, and therefore
unproblematic, scope when compared with a democratically elected
local government, there may be few clear statutory constraints as to
how far BID functions may expand-as exemplified by the discussion
above of the relevant New York law governing BIDs. The Kessler
Court does not answer the question of when BID activities become
too extensive, too broad, or too "governmental" to allow for an
unequal voting scheme under the one person, one vote principle.
Implicitly, this constitutional line of impropriety exists, and it is just a
matter of time before a court, perhaps the Supreme Court, will
declare that a particular BID has crossed it. Indeed, the only special
purpose districts with weighted voting schemes held to be
constitutional exceptions to the one person, one vote principle by the
Supreme Court were districts devised for the sole narrow purpose of
water conservation"-such a singular purpose is a world away from
the diversity of functions today's BIDs engage in.
To take just one example, Philadelphia's largest BID, the Center
City District, has expanded its mission to include the marketing of
Philadelphia's public schools. A report produced by this influential
BID explains:
We compete in an economy in which knowledge, not manual
dexterity or strength, determines success. . . In recent
decades, Center City has dramatically expanded its share of
young, well-educated professionals: 30% of downtown
dwellers, 24,000 residents, are now aged 25 to 34, double the
citywide and regional averages. They work in downtown
office buildings, hospitals and universities. They rent
apartments and buy homes. They patronize restaurants,
shops, cafes and cultural attractions. They bring vital
workplace skills and entrepreneurial drive. But 86% of
them have no children ... Center City is a mecca for recent
college graduates, but once they have children, we lose a
significant share to the suburbs.89
87. Id. at 104.
88. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973);
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
89. Paul R. Levy, Growing Smarter: The Role of Center City's Public Schools in Enhancing
the Competitiveness of Philadelphia, CENTER CITY DIGEST (Ctr. City Dist. and Cent. Pa. Dev.
Corp., Philadelphia, PA), Fall 2004, at 1, available at http://www.centercityphila.org/
docs/falldigest2004.pdf.
Fall 2010]1 BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 109
The BID's response to this dilemma? Make "public schools even
more customer friendly, mirroring the culture of independent
schools."9 So, once again, we find an example of a BID attempting to
harness the benefits of the privatized model; but here it is not simply
seeking to create a clean and safe, mall-like environment on city
streets. Instead, it is attempting to make a public education system
look more like a private one. It proposes that the Center City BID
"work with the School District" to do so.9'
Without a doubt, the state of urban public schools in America is
a public policy issue of paramount concern for the health of cities
generally. Many scholars have attested to the fact that perceived
school quality is one of the main "push factors" encouraging middle
class families to flee to the suburbs." Yet, regardless of whether one
agrees with this rather uncontroversial conclusion, by engaging this
issue, a BID is undeniably taking a position in the volatile public
debate over what constitutes an ideal public school system. This
BID's "vision" of making urban public schools more attractive to
"young, well educated professionals" may indeed have significant
merit. But regardless of how convinced one is that this is the best way
to improve city schools, it must be conceded that it is one "vision" or
strategy, among many other possibilities. Such a strategy may have
unintended ramifications for children of less well educated, non-
professionals. While this complex policy issue will not be resolved
here, what is crucial is that it be recognized for what it is: a public
policy issue.
At what point does BID involvement with a public school system
begin to wrest public control of a public asset and transfer it to a
select group of privileged "Class A" voters? Even minimal BID
engagement with the school system might to some extent risk
replacing a public vision of public schooling-ensured by the
constitutional one person, one vote requirement-with a private one,
reflecting primarily the interests of a narrow group of voters. Thus, if,
as the Kessler Court concluded, providing services to the homeless
may be said not to exceed the narrow purposes allowable under the
one person, one vote exception, how about public education? What if
the BID engages in both areas? Would this still constitute an "entity
with a 'special limited purpose and ... [a] disproportionate effect' on
90. Id. at 2.
91. Id.
92. OLIVER GILLHAM, THE LIMITLESS CITY: A PRIMER ON THE URBAN SPRAWL DEBATE
63 (2002).
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certain constituents[?]"" Recall that in Kramer v. Union Free School
District, the Supreme Court denied that a "31 year-old college
educated stockbroker who live[d] in his parents' home" could be
constitutionally denied the right to vote in school board elections, just
because he had "no children and neither own[ed] nor lease[d] taxable
real property." 4
Putting aside the reality of potentially expansive BID functions,
even the very assumption that certain services-the limited role of
supplementary street sweeper and graffiti scrubber-are simply too
mundane and uncontroversial to justify a mandatory ballot-box
check, is deserving of some constitutional scrutiny. The Kessler
majority minimizes BID activities as "nothing more than efforts to
make the district more attractive to tourists and other consumers.""
However, quality of life concerns such as cleanliness and perceived
safety can spell the difference between economic life and death for
urban neighborhoods. In the high stakes competition for consumer
dollars waged against suburban developments, office parks, and
shopping malls-whether it be for those who would frequent an area
to make purchases or conduct business, or for those who would buy
or rent commercial or residential space-the survival of urban
neighborhoods may turn on the very function BIDs specialize in,
making their districts "attractive." Indeed many BIDs, perhaps
correctly, may claim credit for reestablishing urban vitality, once
again making certain city neighborhoods viably competitive following
painful decades of suburban economic drain." This role can hardly be
characterized as being of marginal significance, let alone not meriting
democratic input under the one person, one vote principle.
Self-help among urban businesses and property owners in the
form of a BID may indeed be admirable, particularly in light of the
trying urban conditions the BID model emerged from in the 1980s
and 1990s. However, the so-called "limited purpose" of BIDs to
maintain reliably clean and safe streets, was once a baseline
expectation of local government. This baseline was presumably
93. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 103 (citation omitted).
94. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 624-25.
95. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 105-06.
96. Leah Brooks, Unveiling Hidden Districts: Assessing the Adoption Patterns of Business
Improvement Districts in California, 60 NAT'L TAX J., 6 (March 2007) (explaining "quantitative
analysis shows that [BIDs] have been able to reduce crime in Los Angeles and Philadelphia and
increase property values in New York City. In addition, anecdotal evidence credits them with a
myriad of neighborhood improvements.").
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reached with citizen input, and significant discretion is involved in
deciding how to achieve it. How should street cleaners and security
guards be supervised? If motorized vehicles and trucks are used to
clean the streets, at what times will they operate? At 2 AM when
their decibels might prove to be a menace to sleeping residents; or at
2 PM when they may interfere with pedestrian and vehicular business
traffic? If capital infrastructure projects are undertaken to improve
the appearance and functionality of the street, should the street be
designed to better accommodate public buses utilized by the city's
lower income population, or taxis and limousines more likely to be
the domain of the middle and upper classes? Discretion looms large.
Even in their most rudimentary functions, BIDs invariably make
"long-term judgments about the way the district should develop when
it decides to spend money in one way rather than in another."" Yet
the residents who would formerly have had a democratic check over
decision making with which they were displeased no longer have such
a check under the BID regime.
Finally, it is argued that even though BIDs might be said to
primarily serve business interests, such businesses are the ones who
pay for this benefit.98 Thus, even though BIDs are funded through a
form of mandatory taxation, the system is said to be fundamentally
fair.' In other words, those who are mandated to pay, i.e., the
property owners, are the primary beneficiaries, while those who do
not pay, simply reap tangential benefits. This formulation, however,
may not be truly reflective of the underlying reality. As the Kessler
dissent points out, "[i]n all likelihood the tenants in the district do in
fact 'pay' for the services ... in the form of higher rents passed on as a
result of higher property 'taxes."'" Thus, it is not necessarily the case
that only those who have the privilege of a vote, pay for BID benefits.
Many who are deprived of a democratic voice may also be
shouldering a good portion, albeit indirectly, of that financial burden.
Furthermore, in the case of the GCBID and other similarly
authorized BIDs who have the ability to raise money through the
issuance of tax exempt bonds, there is a significant risk that the city
will directly bear a financial burden. "These bonds are charged
against the City's constitutional debt limit, reducing the amount of
97. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 124.
98. See supra Part II.
99. See supra Part III.
100. Kessler, 158 F.3d at 123.
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money that the City can raise through its own future bond issues."o.
Not only do bond issues by a BID have a potentially adverse impact
on a city's future ability to secure funds, the city may be held legally
and financially responsible should the BID default on its obligations
or go "belly up."'10
The Kessler Court points out that there is not a constitutional
prohibition on "experimentation" and "innovation.' The majority
suggests that the complexities and challenges confronted by local
government merit creative solutions. And certainly, considering the
grave circumstances confronted by cities across the country during a
half-century of urban decline, such a conclusion might strike one as
eminently reasonable. BIDs' innovative way of circumventing the
free rider problem was of enormous consequence for cities. It was a
problem that, for a generation, frustrated cities' futile attempts to
compete with the professionalized management provided to shopping
mall and office park tenants who eagerly shell out the fees that allow
for a pleasant-some would argue sterile-shopping and workplace
environment."o'
On the other hand, one might argue that even though the BID
framework attempts to replicate the relatively recent, but now
ubiquitous, privatized "common interest" model of development,
there is in fact nothing at all innovative occurring. Tailoring influence
to those identified as "having the greatest stake" in an endeavor is
nothing new. On the contrary, limiting the franchise to those who
happen to own property is a very old technique with deep, but
dubious, roots.'" A brief review of American history might even lead
one to the conclusion that the BID formula for success constitutes a
giant leap backward-a reversion to an undeniably less democratic
era in which one's political voice was regularly determined according
to property wealth-the assumption being that only those who own
property have a sufficient stake in political outcomes. "At one time
the franchise was regarded as the rightful possession of the most
privileged and wealthy in society... [Yet] since the nation's founding
the right to vote has been steadily expanded to include larger and
larger classes of American citizens. Over the course of the last two
101. Id. at 111-12.
102. Id. at 112.
103. Id. at 100-01.
104. Id. at 103.
105. Brooks, supra note 96, at 6.
106. Kessler, 158 F.3d atil7.
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hundred years, both the states and the federal government have
stripped away those restrictions which once limited suffrage to a
privileged minority.""
C. Parceling Governmental Power
The debate over BIDs has deep roots, deeper than one might
imagine at first glance. The contentious debate over how
governmental power should be apportioned stretches back to the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. There America's
founding fathers brokered the great compromise, one which divides
political power both functionally and spatially. The spatial division is,
of course, federalism-a sharing of power between the federal
government and the states which ensures federal supremacy, while at
the same time according significant autonomy to the states. The
proper parameters of this division have been a source of fierce
contention ever since. And while the Constitution does not directly
address the allocation of political power between states and their
many political subdivisions, nor of the further subdivision of those
municipalities, these questions invoke many of the same philosophical
questions, and indeed constitutional principles, that recur in the
debate over federalism.
Returning to the hypothetical from the beginning of the article,
let us suppose that Mr. Old City Dweller, a longtime resident of our
hypothetical city, lives in an unfashionable section of town. He would
like to move to the BID area-with its suburban-like expectation of
cleanliness and order-but he finds himself locked out due to the
prohibitively high price of real estate. His taxes continue to rise and
city services continue to decline. Outside the small geographic area
of the central business district, poverty remains endemic. Benefits of
the revival of downtown do not appear to redound to Mr. Old City
Dweller; in fact, in many respects, he feels worse off since the creation
of the BID. He cannot afford to move to the BID district, and feels
marginalized by his own elected city government. As a resident and
citizen of the city he remains locked out of BID elections.
Nevertheless, he believes that the policies carried out by the
downtown BID may be adversely affecting the remainder of the city.
He feels that he has been deprived of his voice as a citizen. Does Mr.
Old City Dweller have any recourse? Might he have a claim that he
107. Id.
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has been denied equal protection under the law? What might the
Supreme Court have to say to Mr. Old City Dweller?
In Warth v. Seldin, the Supreme Court denied standing to urban
plaintiffs who were locked out of neighboring communities due to
highly restrictive exclusionary zoning-zoning that virtually
precluded the construction of lower to moderate income housing."
The "ordinance, by virtue of regulations concerning 'lot area, set
backs. . . population density, density of use, units per acre, floor area,
sewer requirements, traffic flow, ingress and egress[, and] street
location,' [made] 'practically and economically impossible the
construction of sufficient numbers of low and moderate income'
housing."'" By law, ninety-eight percent of the vacant land in the
town was committed to "single-family detached housing.""o As a
result the plaintiffs, who were lower-income, were unable to afford
housing in this and other suburban communities. Instead the only
affordable option was to remain a resident of the metropolitan area's
financially strapped anchor city."
Greater residential density meant that housing prices were
within reach in the city. But the high concentration of poverty, no
doubt exacerbated by the exclusionary practices in the surrounding
suburban communities, also meant that the city was "forced to
impose higher tax rates ... than would otherwise have been
necessary."11 Furthermore, as a result of the highly restricted living
options sanctioned by the force of law, the plaintiffs "incurred greater
commuting costs, lived in substandard housing, and had fewer
services for their families and poorer schools for their children."113
Similar to the dichotomy that might exist for Mr. Old City Dweller
between the worn and tattered neighborhoods unaided by
supplemental extra-governmental services and those within the
confines of the downtown BID, the plaintiffs in Warth identified a
dramatic disparity between city and suburb. Service deficiencies in
the city included a lack of adequate police protection, an absence of
"play areas for children" and inadequate garbage disposal-all of
108. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
109. Id. at 522 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
110. Id. at 495.
111. Id at 496.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
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which were provided in exclusionary suburban communities with
greater resources.H4
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court rejected that the
plaintiffs had standing to sue on the basis of this striking alleged
inequality."' The Court reasoned that none of the plaintiffs had an
actual interest in property within the boundaries of the suburban
town at issue, they were not subject to the laws in place in this
municipality, and they have never been "denied a variance or permit"
by officials in the town."'6 The implications of this holding are, as the
dissenters protested, seemingly perverse."' By virtue of the laws that
existed in these neighboring suburban municipalities, the plaintiffs
were not only excluded from those communities, they were also
excluded from meeting the standing criteria set-out by the court
permitting a judicial challenge. The dissent decried that "the Court
turn[ed] the very success of the allegedly unconstitutional scheme
into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invalidation.. . [Tlhey will not be
permitted to prove what they have alleged ... because they have not
succeeded in breaching ... the very barriers which are the subject of
the suit."" 8
In the BID context, Mr. Old City Dweller might have an even
weaker claim to standing, for he lives in the very city where BID
enabling legislation was passed-by democratically elected public
officials. Even though BIDs have been thus far exempted from the
one person, one vote principle, BIDs are arguably still a product of
democratic governance. Not only must they be formed through a
frequently time consuming and arduous legislative process, in many
states BIDs must be established with a sunset provision and require
renewal or reauthorization upon expiration."9 In many states where
the duration of BIDs is not explicitly limited, "either the assessment
payers or the municipal government, or both" have power to dissolve
the BID.20 If Mr. Old City Dweller were to file a constitutional claim,
the Court would likely point out the ostensible recourse he has
through the political process-arguably making a claim of standing
even less persuasive that the denied request in Warth. Furthermore,
114. Id. at 524 n.3 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
115. Id. at 493.
116. Id. at 504.
117. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
118. Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
119. BRIFFAULT, supra note 5, at 387.
120. Id. at 388.
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it might be pointed out that BIDs carry substantially more modest
powers than politically independent suburban jurisdictions. For
example, although some scholars have suggested that BIDs should
play a role in zoning decisions,121 they are typically not provided with
such power. Thus, aggrieved citizens may very well be locked out of
judicial redress, even though, as many BID critics have argued, once
established, BIDs operate in a fundamentally undemocratic way.122
The organizational structure of BIDs, although widely varied,
provides inequitable representation to "residents and the less
privileged" and weight voting such that larger property owners are
entitled to greater authority.'" The potential absence of judicial
recourse is particularly troubling considering the evidence that
indirect political checks on BIDs-via municipal government-are
not sufficient.
V. Moving Beyond the Debate
Perhaps it would be useful to move beyond the question of
whether or not BIDs, viewed in isolation, are in fact desirable or
consistent with current constitutional doctrine. Perhaps it is also
important to ask why? Why are BIDs necessary in the first place?
What about the American legal and political context makes them so
valuable, arguably even essential, for well-functioning urban centers?
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence sheds light on this question. In
fact, I argue that its decisions have helped lay the foundation for
BIDs by contributing to the relative disadvantage that has hampered
large urban centers for decades. The Supreme Court has the power
to shape what democracy means, to determine how equality is to be
defined within democratic subdivisions, to clarify what rights are
guaranteed in public and quasi-public places, and to determine how
we are to distinguish the "public" from the "private."
A. BIDs, Political Fragmentation, and the Constitution
The U.S. Constitution, with its precarious balance of federalism,
did not explicitly address the relationship between states and their
political subdivisions. In fact, as far back as 1909, the Supreme Court
confirmed that as a matter of constitutional law, municipalities are
121. Mark S. Davies, Business Improvement Districts, 52 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
187, 217-18 (1997).
122. See supra Part III.
123. Hoyt and Gopal-Agge, supra note 20, at 951.
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mere creatures of the state.2 4  When a soon-to-be-annexed
municipality attempted to resist a merger with the city of Pittsburgh,
the Court responded that the "number, nature and duration of the
powers conferred upon [municipal] corporations and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of
the State."'25 According to the Court, this principle holds true even
where a majority of voters in the annexed city opposes a merger."
Thus, there seemed to be little ambiguity that "the State is supreme
[over its subdivisions],... unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States."'27 Ironically, with the Warth
decision, the Supreme Court stepped in to ensure that the boundaries
of municipal subdivisions-even though of minimal constitutional
significance with regard to state supremacy-become highly
significant when it comes to federal judicial intervention. After
Warth and other high court decisions, such boundaries would
effectively become judicially impenetrable barriers.
The Warth decision is thus instructive as a lesson in why BIDs
were needed in the first place. Some lament that BIDs "threaten to
replicate within cities the fragmented political and fiscal structure and
interlocal public service inequalities characteristic of most American
metropolitan areas." 12 8 But they do this, quite simply, because cities
and their stakeholders have no other viable choice. The reality of a
harshly competitive landscape in which local governments must
compete with one another (in the same way Home Depot competes
with Lowes), cannot be simply wished away. Decisions such as Warth
v. Seldin cemented this reality, ensuring that the dramatically
inequitable distribution of political power and resources between
"municipal haves" and "municipal have-nots" is practically immune
from constitutional challenge.
State laws do delegate a wide range of powers to municipalities.
They do so by providing for both specific powers in particular areas
and the more general delegation of home rule authority. Home rule
provisions vary from state to state, but generally provide the power to
act without first requesting permission from the state legislature.'29
124. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id. at 174-75.
127. Id. at 179.
128. BRIFFAULT, supra note 5, at 376.
129. David E. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the
Field, 21 J.L. & POL. 261, 263 (2005).
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Municipalities are typically provided with the power to establish a
governmental structure of their own, to elect local officials, to zone
and regulate land use, and to raise property tax revenue which may
be used for their own purposes." So, although the U.S. Constitution
does not does not provide state subdivisions with sovereign
constitutional powers, local governments are effectively established
by their states as independent governments with considerable
political power to shape their own destiny.
As Warth illustrates, the Supreme Court has been loath to permit
intrusions into this local autonomy. Ironically, the Court has
steadfastly defended such local autonomy while at the same time
maintaining its own precedential assumptions rejecting an
independent constitutional status for municipalities within the
Constitutional framework of federalism. It has done so even where
such autonomy leads to countervailing constitutional concerns. The
Court has rejected, or refused to consider, constitutional challenges to
inter-local disparities, such as vast school funding inequalities"' and
residential housing disparities, in the name of "the state's legitimate
interest in preserving local control. Local control may not be
constitutionally required . . . but it does seem to be constitutionally
favored."13 2  BIDs constitute an eminently rational response to
suburbia's privileged constitutional status.
The Supreme Court's constitutional preference for the
localism-a preference that has helped support and maintain the
relative disadvantage with which cities contend-is perhaps nowhere
as evident as it is in the area of public education. Two critical
Supreme Court decisions, Milliken v. Bradley and San Antonio v.
Rodriquez illustrate the Court's perspective. In Milliken, the Court
accorded a peculiar level of constitutional respect to state political
subdivisions. Despite the fact that internal subdivisions are purely
matters of state discretion, and that states are ultimately legally
responsible for and in control of ostensibly autonomous local political
decision making, the Court in Milliken concluded that judicial
remedies for constitutional violations "must stop at the school district
line."'33
130. Id.
131. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
132. Barron & Frug, supra note 129, at 264.
133. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 768 (1974).
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Just one year earlier, in Rodriguez, the Court had revealed the
true contours of this principle. Although the Court emphasized its
respect for the political autonomy within internal state political
boundaries, in Rodriguez it was the boundaries themselves, not the
people within those boundaries, that were deemed to be most
constitutionally significant.'" The Court rejected the argument that
the individuals within each local subdivision, here school districts,
represented a definable suspect class appropriate for strict equal
protection scrutiny, even where there were vast disparities in school
funding between localities.' Thus, if we were to ask why large BIDs
such as the Center City District in Philadelphia feel compelled to
expand their activities to include involvement with the public school
system, Milliken and San Antonio might provide some answers.
Milliken, a decision from 1974, was a product of the protracted
struggle to enforce the constitutional mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education'6 to desegregate America's public schools. It addressed a
judicial remediation order resulting from a successful complaint that
the Detroit public school system was racially segregated "as a result
of official policies and actions."'3 7 Due to the rapidly declining white
population within the city limits of Detroit, both the District Court
and Court of Appeals concluded that the only feasible solution to the
endemic segregation in Detroit was a metropolitan-wide
desegregation plan."' Otherwise, the clear result would be "an all
black schools system immediately surrounded by practically all white
suburban school systems, with an overwhelmingly white majority
population in the total metropolitan area.""3
However, the Supreme Court adopted a much more constrained
reading of the kinds of constitutional remedies a court may require.
It reversed the lower court decisions, concluding that the scope of a
"remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitutional
violation."'40 For the majority, "the boundaries of separate and
autonomous school districts" were determinative constitutional
boundaries.14' However, the public agencies who discriminated acted
134. San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 54.
135. Id. at 28.
136. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
137. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 723 (1974).
138. Id. at 735.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 744.
141. Id.
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on the State's authority, and therefore on the State's behalf.142 Of
course, the language of the Equal Protection Clause reads: "no state
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."143 It says nothing of a state's political subdivisions.
Nevertheless, the implications of the Court's decision in Milliken
were clear: Cities were stuck with their predicament of having a
disproportionate share of poverty and disinvestment, a condition that
was driving the middle classes across political boundaries to
advantaged suburban locales.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to harness the power of
the Equal Protection Clause to help ensure that minority-saturated
schools continue down the road toward integration. Instead, it did
the opposite. Had it remained faithful to the constitutional ideals of
Brown v. Board of Education, the result would have been urban
schools that are more palatable to white middle-class families-
families who resisted enrolling their children in systems where they
would stand out as racial and economic outliers. The conditions in
these schools were unequivocally rooted in state violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, in Milliken the Supreme
Court's own peculiar brand of localism trumped equality. BIDs
simply seek to replicate the same sort of prosperity that accompanies,
and has accompanied during decades of urban decline, localism at the
suburban level. They have done so by cordoning off localities within
localities and imbuing sublocal urban neighborhoods with some of the
same advantages suburban communities have been afforded via the
Supreme Court's arguably misguided jurisprudence.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, what
began as a class action lawsuit by a group of parents with students
attending the San Antonio, Texas, public schools became a definitive
constitutional statement on the limits of equality, and a further
illustration of the puzzling constitutional respect the Court would
accord local boundaries. Those challenging the endemic inequality in
the Texas public schools argued that the system of funding, which
relied heavily upon local property tax, discriminated on the basis of
wealth in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.'" The disparity in
per-pupil expenditures in the various school districts in the San
Antonio metropolitan area was vast-for example, in one inner-city
142. Id. at 772 (White, J. dissenting).
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
144. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
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school district just $356 was spent per pupil, while an affluent school
district allocated nearly $600.145 At the same time, the poorest school
districts in the region were on average burdened with some of the
highest property tax rates, while the most affluent benefited from the
lowest." A majority of the Court, however, denied that the alleged
discrimination between children living in localities with well-funded
schools and those residing in districts that were relatively deprived,
could be said to have been imposed on a definable "suspect class"
eligible for strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.147 In
other words, school districts were each made up of "a large, diverse,
and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence
in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other
districts.",148
The Supreme Court seemed to be saying in Rodriguez, as it did
in Milliken, that it was unwilling to breach the autonomy of
localities-that the internal political functioning of local districts in
worthy of constitutional respect-even when such deference results in
generalized disparities that contravene equal protection principles.
Why? Because those who reside within such localities do not possess
the requisite uniformity to constitute a sufficient "class" for equal
protection purposes. Thus, localities are at once constitutionally
impenetrable and internally incoherent. They provide for critical
political independence that is simultaneously at the heart of a
traditional constitutional respect for local power, and insignificant
when judged by the human-level disparities produced.
The reality is that the true political decision-maker responsible
for vast inequalities among political subdivisions-the State-is
graced with constitutional impunity. As the Rodriguez dissenters so
poignantly explained:
The means for financing public education in Texas are
selected and specified by the State. It is the State that has
created local school districts and tied educational funding to
local property tax and thereby to local district wealth. At
the same time, governmentally imposed land use controls
have undoubtedly encouraged and rigidified natural trends
in the allocation of particular areas for residential or
145. Id. at 11-13, n.33.
146. Id. at 75.
147. Id. at 28.
148. Id.
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commercial use, and thus determined each district's amount
of taxable property wealth.149
Thus, the true constitutional actors-the States-have
systemically permitted, if not promoted, dramatic intrastate
disparities. Their political choices have advantaged suburban
localities-particularly those who leveraged their political boundaries
to maintain an exclusively middle to upper-class population by
imposing policies such as exclusionary zoning. The Court in
Rodriguez immunized the very political actors targeted by the
Fourteenth Amendment. By shifting the focus to local autonomy, the
Rodriguez Court lifted constitutional responsibility from where it
belonged and put the political onus of dealing with the resulting
inequality on those who had no effective means of fighting back-the
big cities that already harbored a disproportionate share of
disadvantaged population.
BIDs are typically, if at all, only tangentially involved with urban
schooling. Yet as precedent, Rodriguez says much about how
American cities arrived at the predicament they found themselves
in-and why quasi-privatization in the form of BIDs, was a necessary
remedy. By providing localities with a form of preferred
constitutional status, downtown districts had no other choice but to
find an innovative way to "exclusivize" themselves-as suburban
jurisdictions have been doing for decades.
B. The Public Forum Conundrum
The loss of competitiveness by urban business districts is not
limited to the political disadvantages borne of the Supreme Court's
constitutional imprimatur on political fragmentation. The Court's
jurisprudence could also be said to have contributed to the need for
BIDs in another way-by way of its evolving, and arguably
contracting, interpretation of the public forum doctrine.
Under America's constitutional system, public places have
always carried certain accompanying "inconveniences." These
"inconveniences" include the understanding that citizens sharing
public spaces will at times be confronted with what might feel like a
cacophony of unwelcome voices and messages. The ideas expressed,
and the manner in which they are conveyed, may provoke distaste,
revulsion or mere annoyance, but it has long been understood that
149. Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added).
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First Amendment freedoms come with certain costs-and a consensus
appears to have been reached that the benefits are worth the price.
As Justice Roberts famously proclaimed in 1939:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The
privilege .. . must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged
or denied."o
Roberts' dictum would come to form the "public forum
doctrine," utilizing principles of common law property rights to assert
a "kind of First Amendment easement" by the public over certain
public property.m'
The public forum doctrine is, of course, consistent with the long
tradition of conceptualizing public places as loci of expressive social
and political interaction. It is here, in the proverbial public square,
where all of the unpredictable benefits and burdens of the expressive
freedoms America's Founders so courageous established play out,
like a daily impromptu chemistry experiment. These are the places
where Americans must learn about one another, confront difference,
and come to terms with the vast spectrum of humanity that comprises
the American political landscape. A public forum is at once mundane
and sacred. A public park where one walks one's dog or a main street
where one shops for daily necessities is concomitantly an essential
location for critical political speech-a sui generis destination where
individuals and groups who run the gamut of religious, ideological or
just plain eccentric predispositions engage in a wide range of
expressive discourse.
However, the world has changed much since 1939. The rapid
growth of the automobile, and the transformation of the country into
a suburban nation, has fundamentally reshaped the public forum.
Today, the public square takes many forms. As mobile consumers of
place, Americans confront a menu of options. Profligate fuel
consumption, three-car garages and an endless web of interstate
150. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
151. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 189, 238 (1983).
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highways have removed the constraints that made the traditional
public square-the pedestrian-packed sidewalks and streets
envisioned in Hague-a mandatory destination, or at minimum, an
unavoidable thoroughfare. Justice Kennedy acknowledged this
modern reality when he argued-unsuccessfully-that an airport
should be deemed a public forum for First Amendment purposes. "It
is of particular importance to recognize these spaces are public
forums because in these days an airport is one of the few government-
owned spaces where many persons have extensive contact with other
members of the public ... [I]t is critical that we preserve these areas
for protected speech."152
In light of the nationwide trend toward urban gentrification, the
perspective that cities are once again desirable places to live has
taken root. As a result, many Americans consciously choose to live in
the vicinity of a downtown public forum. One might imagine a
contemporary suburbanite choosing to sell their suburban home in a
pristine gated community, and opting for the "public square
product"-an expensive condominium in the center of town that
offers all of the "vitality and excitement of urban living." But as BID
directors across the country are certainly aware, this consumer could
just as easily retreat back to the suburbs if the downtown district's
luster begins to fade. BIDs are thus diligently focused of perfecting
their urban product. Their job however, has been made much more
difficult by the Supreme Court. They must do their job within the
constraints of a constitutionally designated public forum. Their
competitors have the distinct advantage of being exempt from this
requirement. The playing field is not level.
This would not been the case if comparable privatized quasi-
public places such as the mall, corporate office park, private
residential communities and the most recent contemporary hybrid of
all three, the so-called Lifestyle Center-were also deemed public
fora, and thus "inhibited" by First Amendment entitlements. All of
these modern incarnations include spaces that mimic the traditional
public square, and, in some sense, seek to replicate traditional public
destinations. But the Supreme Court, after initially extending the
public forum doctrine to privatized public places, sharply reversed
course.
It only took seven years from the time Roberts uttered his
famous dictum in Hague for the Court to recognize inherent
152. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992).
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difficulties of applying the Court's public forum doctrine in a world
where public places may be placed in private hands.' In Marsh v.
Alabama, the Court considered the town of Chickasaw, a suburb that
was, with one exception, comparable to any other municipality in the
Mobile, Alabama region."' While Chickasaw functioned like any
other typical town of the time, the entirety of Chickasaw was in fact
privately owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. "In the stores
the corporation had posted a notice which read as follows: 'This is
Private Property, and Without Written Permission, No Street, or
House Vendor, Agent or Solicitation of Any Kind Will Be
Permitted.""" Translation: Supreme Court Keep Out-The Public
Forum Doctrine Does Not Apply Here.
The Supreme Court, however, did not cooperate. It explained
that "[o]wnership does not always mean absolute dominion. The
more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."' Even in
a company town such as Chickasaw, private owners "cannot curtail
the liberty of press and religion.""5 Thus, the Court carved out a
"public functions" exception to the otherwise applicable rule that the
First Amendment only applies to state action.
Had this exception remained intact, the relative disorder which
accompanies unbridled free expression would have applied equally to
privatized and government-owned public places. Without such an
exception urban business districts will presumably become much less
desirable for retailers and other businesses who seek a controlled
environment to maximize profits-particularly in a world where
privately owned public places have become an increasingly ubiquitous
option. The implication of Marsh, however, was that suburban
shopping malls and office parks would also be required to tolerate the
mandates of the First Amendment. Such mandates would clearly
make fostering a public environment most conducive to business
activities-if this is defined as one devoid of burdensome expressive
distractions-much more difficult.
153. Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 503.
156. Id. at 506.
157. Id. at 508.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:1126
The modern suburban shopping mall and office park of course
did not exist at the time Marsh v. Alabama was decided. Twenty
years later, however, the Court did have the opportunity to confront
this modern incarnation of the company town. In Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, the owners of a then "newly
developed shopping center complex" near Altoona, Pennsylvania,
what today would be characterized as a "strip mall," sought to
exclude picketers from its property. "' The peaceful picketers,
members of the Amalgamated Food Employees Union, stood in
protest outside of a new supermarket, drawing attention to the
nonunion status of its employees and resultant nonunion wages and
benefits. Clearly such activity was inconsistent with the goals of the
businesses that occupied the shopping center. Such expression did
not contribute to the pleasant, undisturbed public environment-
singularly focused on the promotion of commerce-the owners
presumably had an interest in maintaining.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion, penned by Justice Marshall,
began with "the premise that peaceful picketing carried on in a
location open generally to the public is, absent other factors involving
the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the First
Amendment.""9 Had this store been a part of "the business area of a
municipality," the Court opined, there would be no question that the
union members' expression would have been protected." Like
Marsh v. State of Alabama, the Logan Valley strip mall was the
"functional equivalent" of a downtown "business district."'61 The
mall opened itself to the public, and like a town center, was utilized
by citizens for prosaic daily tasks-the only difference being that a
walk across an expanse of pavement to and from ones' car replaced
the traditional promenade down Main Street. Privatization would not
be permitted to strip the public of its fundamental right of expression
in a public forum.
This principled conclusion would last precisely four years. In
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Supreme Court substantially pared back
the applicability of its holding in Logan Valley.12 Just four years after
that, a majority of the Court explicitly overruled Logan Valley-all
158. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 310
(1968).
159. Id. at 313.
160. Id. at 315.
161. Id. at 318.
162. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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but extinguishing Marsh's limited exception to the state action
doctrine. At issue in Lloyd was whether an enclosed mall-a
''relatively new concept in shopping center design" according to the
majority-could constitutionally exclude those engaged in a peaceful
distribution of handbills protesting the draft and the war in
Vietnam. 163  The entirely internal, climate controlled "mall"
represented the next logical step in the evolving privatization of the
public realm. Indeed, the design was described by an architectural
expert as a method for making "shopping easy and pleasant. [T]o
help realize the goal of maximum sales (for the Center), the shops are
grouped about special pedestrian ways or malls. Here the shopper is
isolated from the noise, fumes, confusion and distraction which he
normally finds along city streets."'" Indeed, such shopping centers
not only inoculated their environment from the hassles and untidiness
of real world city streets, not unlike many modern BIDs, their visitors
had the benefit of private security guards which had "police
authority" within the center. These guards wore "uniforms similar to
those worn by city police" and were "licensed to carry handguns.""
Both a District and Appeals Court concluded that because the
mall was the "functional equivalent of a public business district," the
anti-handbilling scheme violated the constitutional rights of the
respondents.'" This time, however, the Supreme Court disagreed.167
The High Court emphasized the differences between the speech at
issue here, and that in Logan Valley.'" For the majority the
distinction merited a different outcome-here the expression
concerned American foreign policy, a topic unrelated to the
operation of the shopping center-whereas in Logan Valley, the
picketers focused on the non-union hiring policies of a resident retail
establishment. 69
The final nail in the coffin of the public functions exception for
privatized public space was delivered in Hudgens v. National Labor
Relations Board."o In Hudgens, the Court concluded that warehouse
employees did not have a First Amendment right to enter a shopping
163. Id. at 553-56.
164. Id. at 554.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 556.
167. Id. at 569.
168. Id. at 563-64.
169. Id. at 562.
170. Hudgens v. Nat'1 Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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center in suburban Atlanta, Georgia in order to make public their
strike against the shoe company that employed them.' Although the
Court did not explicitly overrule Marsh v. Alabama in Hudgens, the
Court reversed Logan Valley.'72 In doing so, it made its holding in
Marsh a virtual nullity. According to the majority, the reasoning in
Lloyd was simply inconsistent with its Logan Valley decision-and it
was the Lloyd rationale, prioritizing property rights over free speech,
that would ultimately prove victorious."' This victory for property
rights was a relative loss for the American city. Urban business
districts, already awash in troubles, now faced one additional obstacle
in their attempt to remain viably competitive with suburban shopping
malls. Their competition had been given a valuable handicap-First
Amendment immunity.
Conclusion
BIDs have both proponents and detractors. They remain
perched in an unsettling and precarious constitutional position, and
their constitutionality remains very much an open question. Behind
the scenes, BIDs are in fact nursing a disadvantageous constitutional
condition established long before the concept of a BID was a reality.
BIDs, in other words, devote much of their energy to contending with
the legacy of Warth, Milliken, San Antonio, Lloyd and Hudgens. The
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
compounds the urban disadvantages borne of metropolitan
fragmentation, school systems weighted down by a legacy of racism,
and unequal application of the public forum doctrine.
By treating municipal borders as daunting walls that keep out
constitutional challenges, the Court has validated systemic urban
disadvantages. By defining school district lines as constitutionally
impenetrable boundaries for purposes of judicial intervention
intended to remedy deeply entrenched racial segregation, the Court
has helped ensured that urban public schools maintain their status as
"identifiably Black"' 7 -thus cementing the status quo that remains
after decades of urban the white flight. By insisting that First
Amendment "inconveniences" be borne only by nonprivatized public
171. Id.at521.
172. Id. at 518.
173. Id.
174. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732 (1974).
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places, the Court chose favorites in the competitive struggle to create
and maintain attractive public places.
Alas, if Constitutional Law is not capable of welcoming the
middle classes to American cities-and in fact seems to exacerbate
the ills that led to their exodus-why not do so though private sector
"innovation" in the form of a BID? Stripped of their ability to
challenge their disadvantaged political and economic position caused
by years of competition from economically and politically nimble
suburban competitors, big city survival demands the surgeon's knife.
In a sea of poverty, educational inequality, impoverished urban
politics and disorder, BIDs allow struggling business districts to
surgically carve out some prosperous autonomy of their own.
